We analyze (non-deterministic) contests with anonymous contest success functions. There is no restriction on the number of contestants or on their valuations for the prize. We provide intuitive and easily veri…able conditions for the existence of an equilibrium with properties similar to the one of the (deterministic) all-pay auction. Since these conditions are ful…lled for a wide array of situations, the predictions of this equilibrium are very robust to the speci…c details of the contest. An application of this result contributes to …ll a gap in the analysis of the popular Tullock rentseeking game because it characterizes properties of an equilibrium for increasing returns to scale larger than two, for any number of contestants and in contests with or without a common value.
Introduction
In a contest agents exert irreversible e¤ort to increase their probability of winning a prize. Contests have been used to analyze a variety of situations including lobbying, rent-seeking and rent-defending contests, litigation, political campaigns, con ‡ict, patent races, arms races, sports events or R&D competition. Moreover, recent papers (like e.g. Alesina and Spolaore (2006) , Baron and Diermeier (2006) , Konrad (2000a Konrad ( , 2000b or Polborn and Klumpp (2006) ) have embedded contests in larger political economy models in order to capture the e¤ect of con ‡ict on other variables of interest.
Particularly when a contest model is embedded in a larger game, it is desirable that equilibrium payo¤s do not change too much as the primitives of the contest change. Otherwise, the predictions of the larger model might not be robust to changes in the primitives of the contest subgame. The present paper determines a class of contests with fairly di¤erent primitives that admits essentially the same equilibrium. Equilibrium predictions within this class of contests can, thus, be considered robust to the speci…cation of the contest. Moreover, the class includes two prominent models of contests.
The crucial element in the speci…cation of a contest is the so-called contest success function (CSF), which associates to each vector of contestants' e¤ort levels a lottery specifying for each agent a probability of getting the prize. In the literature there are two prominent ways to model contests.
First, there is the all-pay auction, in which the player exerting the highest e¤ort wins the prize with probability one. Such a contest is therefore called deterministic (or perfectly discriminating). It has been analyzed by Hillman and Riley (1989) , Baye et al. (1993 Baye et al. ( , 1996 or Che and Gale (1998) , among others.
For later reference we summarize the results of Hillman and Riley (1989) and Baye et al. (1996) as follows. Denote the valuation of bidder B i for the prize by V i and suppose that V 1 V 2 V n . There exists a Nash equilibrium in mixed-strategies to the all-pay auction. In this equilibrium, bidder B 1 randomizes uniformly on [0; V 2 ], while bidder B 2 abstains with probability 1 V 2 =V 1 and adopts the same mixed-strategy as B 1 , given that he enters the contest. All other contestants abstain with probability one. Expected equilibrium payo¤s are E 1 = V 1 V 2 and E j = 0 for all B j with j > 1. The expected revenue is ER = V 2 (V 1 + V 2 )=(2V 1 ). 1 In the sequel we will use the term all-pay auction equilibrium to indicate an equilibrium in which the expected equilibrium bids, payo¤s and revenues (but not necessarily the distributions of bids) are as in the (deterministic) all-pay auction (see De…nition 3.1). Note that these equilibria have important implications for the participation in the aforementioned applications of contests. It is su¢ cient to deal with two contestants, because further players prefer to abstain.
Second, a very prominent class of contest games is the so-called Tullock's Rent-Seeking Game. Given a vector of e¤orts b and R, a positive parameter measuring returns to scale from e¤ort, in Tullock's speci…cation the probability that bidder B i wins the contest is given by
Note that if R = 0, that is, the so-called contest success function is completely insensitive to e¤ort, the extreme case of a (fair) lottery is obtained. The opposite case of extreme sensitivity (R ! 1) in which only e¤orts matter yields the (deterministic) all-pay auction. Hence, we might think of R as specifying how much the extreme requirement of the deterministic all-pay auction is relaxed through chance in the assignment of the prize.
Tullock's Rent-Seeking Game has been analyzed by Tullock (1980) , Pérez-Castrillo and Verdier (1992), Baye et al. (1994) and Skaperdas (1996) , among others. Equilibria in this game are well understood when R is relatively small, because then there exist pure strategy equilibria. However, this is not so for larger R. For 2 < R < 1, we are only aware of one study (Baye et al. (1994) ), which restricts to two contestants with equal valuations. For this large range of parameter values, the widely applied Tullock's Rent-Seeking Game o¤ers, hence, no prediction concerning rent-seeking outlays when there are more than two contestants or when valuations di¤er. Moreover, it is not known what properties of the deterministic all-pay auction extend to the non-deterministic Tullock's Rent-Seeking Game.
For tractability reasons applications of Tullock's Rent-Seeking Game suppose very often that R = 1. This case yields very di¤erent results from the deterministic all-pay auction. For instance, equilibrium payo¤s are, in general, di¤erent. As a consequence, more than two contestants might have an incentive to participate actively in the contest. Thus, it is no longer su¢ cient to deal with two contestants. Further di¤erences between Tullock's Rent-Seeking Game and deterministic all-pay auction exist and the reader may …nd discussions in Nitzan (1994) , Che and Gale (2000) and Fang (2002) .
The purpose of the present paper is, hence, twofold:
1. We analyze to what extent the equilibrium predictions of the deterministic all-pay auction are robust to di¤erent amounts of randomness in the assignment process for the price. This randomness might be introduced following (1.1) with R …nite, but it is worth to point out at this point that we do not limit our analysis to logit formulations of the CSF.
2. We contribute to close the gap in the analysis of Tullock's Rent-Seeking Game, because our main result applies for 2 < R < 1, for any number of contestants, and for any valuations for the political prize the contestants might have.
Our main result speci…es conditions on the CSF that are su¢ cient for an all-pay auction equilibrium to exist. The main conditions are three. Anonymity is used to construct an equilibrium for general situations building on an equilibrium of the symmetric two bidder contest. While the deterministic all-pay auction is anonymous, the other two conditions relax the requirement that the highest bidder wins the contest for sure. Su¢ cient Discrimination (SD) says that the contest has to be deterministic enough. Su¢ cient Monotonicity (SM) requires that increasing one's bid should yield a su¢ ciently high win probability. We show then that these conditions are ful…lled under a variety of very di¤erent CSFs, including Tullock's Rent-Seeking Game.
Contests have been reviewed, for example, in Nitzan (1994) and Konrad (2007) . Usually, papers on contests specify a particular CSF and analyze equilibrium. Consequently, there are few papers dealing with a general class of CSFs and we are not aware of any carrying out an analysis at our level of generality. 2 The present paper is most related to Che and Gale (2000) , Alcalde and Dahm (2007) and Baye et al. (1994) . Che and Gale analyze a family of linear di¤erence-form contests with two bidders that is characterized by a non-negative parameter. Similarly to Tullock's Rent-Reeking Game, the scalar speci…es how deterministic the contest is. As a result, the family contains the polar cases of the (fair) lottery and the (deterministic) all-pay auction. Che and Gale analyze mixed-strategy equilibria and show the convergence of the equilibrium to that of the all-pay auction as the di¤erence-form contest approaches the all-pay auction. In contrast, the present paper speci…es conditions under which a non-deterministic contest (e.g. Tullock's Rent-Seeking Game with 2 < R < 1) admits all-pay auction equilibria. 3 Alcalde and Dahm de…ne the Serial Contest (for a formal de…nition see Subsection 4.2) which is a di¤erent family of contests that also includes the two polar cases depending on a scalar. They show that the Serial Contest admits all-pay auction equilibria when the contest is deterministic enough. The present paper obtains this result as a special case. However, contrary to the present paper, their proof relies on the homogeneity of degree zero of the CSF. Both papers follow Baye et al. (1994) by using an auxiliary contest with a …nite bidding space to in order to analyze mixed-strategy equilibria in the original contest. This paper is organized as follows. The next section introduces the class of contests analyzed in the present paper and de…nes an auxiliary contest with a …nite grid on the bidding space. Section 3 establishes our main result which we apply in Section 4 to speci…c contests. The last section o¤ers some concluding remarks. 4 
Contests

Preliminaries
There are n > 1 players wishing to participate in a contest. The set of contestants or bidders is denoted by B = fB 1 ; : : : ; B i ; : : : ; B n g. Each contestant has a valuation for the object, denoted by V i , and submits a bid b i 2 R + . Outlays are irreversible. Bidders are risk-neutral, and they bid simultaneously. The valuations are common knowledge and without loss of generality ordered such that V 1 V 2 : : : V n > 0.
It is assumed that the contest administrator commits to determine the winner through a contest success function. This function associates, to each vector of bids b = (b 1 ; : : : ; b n ), a lottery specifying for each agent a probability of getting the object.
De…nition 2.1. [CSF]
A contest success function is a mapping
Throughout this paper we assume that contest success functions satisfy the following Incentive Property.
De…nition 2.2. [IP]
We say that CSF satis…es the Incentive Property if, for each bidder B i , and other agents'bids b i 2 R n 1 + n f0g,
Let us observe that [IP] is a natural condition that is satis…ed by all the (homogeneous) CSFs studied in the literature. In particular, (2:1) speci…es a weak monotonicity property, of each bidder's winning probability, in her own bid; (2:2) establishes that when some bidder's winning probability increases (resp. decreases), then the winning probability of any other bidder decreases (resp. increases); and (2:3) says that no bidder has a positive winning probability unless her bid is positive (or all bidders bid zero).
Given the contest success function , agents'expected utility from participating in the contest, when the vector of bids is b, is
We denote a mixed-strategy for player B i by i and indicate the associated strategy pro…le by .
A Class of Contest Success Functions
We describe now properties of the class of contest success functions analyzed in this paper. The …rst axiom is Anonymity, a property establishing that each agent's probability is independent of her label and depends only on the vector of bids.
(A) Anonymity: For any permutation function of B (i.e., a bijection :
Note that this axiom also implies that all bidders submitting identical bids must obtain equal probabilities of winning. Speci…cally, for the degenerated bid vector (all contestants bid zero), Anonymity and the de…nition of a CSF imply that the CSF assigns win probability 1=n to all contestants, as e.g. in Baye et al. (1994) .
The present paper makes use of continuity properties of contestants'payo¤ functions by applying results of Dasgupta and Maskin (1986) to contests. Therefore, a natural requirement is continuity of the CSF. However, the most commonly used CSFs, like the perfectly discriminating all-pay auction or Tullock's Rent-Reeking Game, are not continuous everywhere. 4 To avoid excluding these CSFs, we allow for a weaker form of continuity of the CSF.
Given a vector of bids
The following property assures that the set of discontinuities of the CSF is 'small'and that it 'pays'to increase outlays slightly at these points.
(DS) Discontinuity Set: Given B i 2 B, if i is discontinuous at b, then:
For instance, in the popular Tullock's Rent-Seeking Game the CSF is continuous everywhere except at the degenerate bid vector, when all contestants bid zero. Thus, b i max = 0. The second part of (DS) requires in such a case simply that in order to obtain a strictly positive win probability contestant B j , distinct of B i , has to participate actively in the contest. In other words, zero outlays by a contestant imply that this player has no chance to win the contest. But note that (DS) is general enough to accommodate the perfectly discriminating all-pay auction in which the CSF is continuous everywhere except when two or more contestants tie for the highest bid.
In the following we focus on contests assigning win probabilities through an anonymous CSF ful…lling (DS).
The Continuous and the Finite Contest
In this paper we follow the approach in Baye et al. (1994) by relating the original contest with continuous strategy space to another one in which there is a …nite grid on the bidding space. Note that the latter is realistic when there is a smallest monetary unit, like in experimental settings. Given some G 2 N + , the contest is …nite with grid G and smallest monetary unit 1=G if the strategy space is discrete such that only bids that coincide with the grid fm; m + 1=G; m + 2=G; : : : ; m + (G 1)=G; m + 1g for all m 2 N + are feasible. We refer to this game as the …nite contest and indicate an arbitrary element of the grid by x=G, where x 2 N + .
As a starting point for our analysis we follow Baye et al. (1994) and apply results of Dasgupta and Maskin (1986) to our model. Consider a contest with n bidders and common value. Let G = ( G 1 ; ::; G n ) denote an equilibrium to the contest with …nite grid G. The next lemma establishes existence of a symmetric mixed-strategy equilibrium to both the continuous and …nite contest and relates these equilibria. 5 Lemma 2.3. Consider a contest with common value V and contest success function satisfying (A) and (DS). This contest possesses a symmetric mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium, both when the strategy space is …nite and when it is continuous. Moreover, the pro…le = lim G!1 G exists and constitutes a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium to the continuous contest.
Proof. Note that the existence of a common value and (A) imply that both the …nite and the continuous contest are symmetric games. With this, the existence of a symmetric equilibrium for the contest with …nite grid G follows from Lemma 6 in Dasgupta and Maskin (1986) . We show that the conditions of their Theorem 6 are also satis…ed. This theorem guarantees the existence of a symmetric mixed-strategy equilibrium when the strategy space is continuous. In addition, the proof of Dasgupta and Maskin's Theorem 6 shows that the limiting equilibrium of a …nite approximation to the strategy space as the grid size goes to zero is indeed an equilibrium to the continuous game. The application of their theorem requires some conditions to be ful…lled. First, the sum of payo¤s must be upper semi-continuous. Since
V ] and i = 1; 2; : : : ; n. This completes the proof when the CSF is continuous. For discontinuous CSFs ful…lling (DS) two further properties must be ful…lled. Third, one must be able to express a set of points that includes the discontinuities as a function relating the strategies of pairs of contestants. Given (DS) the identity function can be used to de…ne this set. Fourth, a so-called 7 property must hold. Let k 1 denote the cardinality of the bid b i max in b i . Property is ful…lled, since
holds. Thus, Theorem 6 in Dasgupta and Maskin (1986) can be applied.
The Main Result
As explained in the Introduction, in this section we give conditions for the existence of an equilibrium to non-deterministic contests that has properties of the one of the deterministic all-pay auction. We de…ne …rst what we mean by an all-pay auction equilibrium.
In an all-pay auction equilibrium the expected bid of contestant
. All other contestants abstain from the contest (by bidding zero).
In the perfectly discriminating all-pay auction there is a unique equilibrium if V 2 > V 3 . When there is a multiplicity of equilibria, in no equilibrium there is a contestant whose expected payo¤ exceeds the one speci…ed in the statement. Moreover, the only case in which there is no revenue equivalence among equilibria is when more than one contestant have the second highest valuation which is strictly lower than the highest one. See Baye et al. (1996) for more details.
It turns out that we can guarantee the existence of an all-pay auction equilibrium when besides properties (A) and (DS) the contest success function is su¢ ciently discriminating and monotonic in two active player contests. 6 The following two conditions will be used in the …nite game. Remember that in the discrete setting bidding (x + 1)=G represents a marginal increase of the bid x=G. For simplicity of exposition, let x denote the integer such that x GV 1 < x + 1.
The …rst condition speci…es a minimum win probability that outbidding the opponent by the minimum amount must yield.
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(SD) Su¢ cient Discrimination: For each x 2 f0; 1; :::; xg,
Note that the right hand side, RHS from now on, is a strictly decreasing function with values in [1; 1=2) . Thus, the CSF must be su¢ ciently discriminating in favor of the higher bidder. Hence, (SD) speci…es a lower bound on how much the extreme case of the (deterministic) all-pay auction, in which the higher bidder wins the contest for sure, can be relaxed. The next condition requires that a marginal increase of the bid x=G to (x + 1)=G yields a su¢ ciently higher win probability than before. 
Note, again that (SM) is ful…lled in the extreme case of the (deterministic) all-pay auction.
We are now in a position to present our main result. To prove this result we use several lemmata. For a sketch of the proof consider the following example with particularly simple equilibrium strategies. Example 3.4. Consider Tullock's Rent-Seeking Game with R = 2. In the case of a common value, the …rst order conditions characterize maximizers of expected utility for each agent. 7 Both contestants bid half of their common valuation. Lemma 2.3 established the existence of a symmetric equilibrium to common value contests for more general situations. Building on this symmetric equilibrium we construct an equilibrium to two-player contests without common value when, say, V 1 V 2 . Note that in the symmetric equilibrium the rent is completely dissipated and contestants obtain zero payo¤s. Lemma 3.5 shows that the same is true under (SD) and (SM) in a wide class of symmetric equilibria. Notice also that the increase in B 1 's valuation w.r.t. the symmetric situation does not change the problem of contestant B 2 . Hence, given b 1 = V 2 =2, her best reply is still to bid b 2 = V 2 =2, on one hand, or, on the other, to bid zero. So she is also willing to mix between the two. If she mixes with the right frequency, then the maximization problem of contestant B 1 admits the same solution as in the symmetric game. Consequently, the following is an equilibrium to the asymmetric contest. Contestant B 1 bids the optimal strategy of the symmetric game b 1 = V 2 =2 and contestant B 2 abstains with probability (1 V 2 =V 1 ) and bids b 2 = V 2 =2 whenever she participates. Lemma 3.6 establishes such a result for any symmetric equilibrium in which the rent is completely dissipated. The last step is to observe that further contestants with lower valuations than V 2 cannot do better than B 2 . Given the speci…ed bids of the …rst two contestants they prefer to abstain from the contest. Thus, the described strategies constitute an all-pay auction equilibrium in mixed-strategies to the n-player Tullock's Rent-Seeking Game with R = 2 and asymmetric valuations.
The next lemma, and its proof, follows some of the reasoning in Baye et al. (1994) and generalizes it to a broader class of contests.
Lemma 3.5. Consider a 2-bidder contest with …nite grid G and common value V in which the contest success function satis…es (A), (SD) and (SM). In any symmetric Nash equilibrium G = ( G 1 ; G 2 ) it is true that for i = 1; 2:
Proof. First of all, let us introduce some additional notation. Given G, and agent B i 's strategy G i , G ik denotes the probability that agent B i assigns to bidding k=G. Moreover, it is easy to see that, at equilibrium, G ik = 0 for any agent B i and bid such that k > x. To prove Lemma 3.5, we will concentrate on agent B 1 . A similar reasoning applies to agent B 2 .
(1) (a) For the lower bound: The expected payo¤ from bidding x=G when the opponent follows the equilibrium strategy G 2 is
For the upper bound, since G is an equilibrium, agent B 1 must react optimally to B 2 's strategy. Thus, for all x=G:
Let x=G 0 be the lowest bid that is part of the symmetric mixed-strategy equilibrium. 8 By (ii) condition (3.4) holds with equality. Using (A), we have
Computing G 2x from equation (3.5) and substitution in inequality (3.6) yields
(3.7)
Note that (SM) implies that every term on the left hand side, LHS from now on, of condition (3.7) is non-negative. Suppose, by way of contradiction, that E 1 G > 1=G. The RHS of condition (3.7) is strictly smaller than
Under (SD) this expression is smaller than zero, a contradiction.
(2) We have that in a symmetric equilibrium E i ( G ) = V PrfB i winsg E( G i ). Summing up for both agents gives 2E 1 G = V [PrfB 1 winsg + PrfB 2 winsg] 2E( G 1 ) and rearranging yields the statement.
Lemma 3.6. Let C S be a (continuous) 2-bidder contest with common valueṼ . Let C A be the same contest with asymmetric valuations
is a symmetric (possibly mixed) Nash equilibrium strategy pro…le to C S in which the rent is completely dissipated (in expectation), then the following strategy pro…le = ( 1 ; 2 ) constitutes a Nash equilibrium to C A : Contestant B 1 bids 1 = 1 and contestant B 2 's strategy 2 is such that she abstains from the contest with probability (1 V 2 =V 1 ) and bids 2 whenever she participates.
Proof. Note …rst that in C S the complete dissipation of rents implies thatṼ = E ( 1 ) + E ( 2 ). Since the equilibrium is symmetric, we have E ( i ) =Ṽ =2, i 2 f1; 2g. The symmetry of the game assures that on average each player wins half of the times and, thus, in C S we have E i ( ) = 0, i 2 f1; 2g.
To see that in C A contestant B 2 has no pro…table deviation from 2 , note that, since 1 = 1 and V 2 =Ṽ is the same in C S and C A , any pure strategy in C A yields the same as in C S and B 2 obtains E 2 ( ) = 0. She is, hence, willing to abstain with probability
For B 1 note that in C S , given the mixed-strategy by B 2 , all pure strategies b 1 in the support of maximize
where E[PrfB 1 winsjb 1 ; ; g] is B 1 's expected win probability from the pure strategy b 1 when the CSF is and B 2 mixes according to the equilibrium strategy . Note that, although we do not know whether is a continuous, discrete, or partially continuous and discrete distribution, the following must be true. For any constant A, any b 1 which is a maximizer of (3.8) is also a maximizer of
The proof is completed by noticing that (3.9) with A = (1 V 2 =V 1 )V 1 is the payo¤ of the pure strategy b 1 in C A , with 2 = conditional on entry. 9 We are now in a position to prove Theorem 3.3. Proof of Theorem 3.3. Suppose V 1 V 2 V n . and that the contest success function satis…es (A), (DS), (SD) and (SM). We show the existence of an all-pay auction equilibrium by construction.
Suppose there were two contestants with common value V 2 . Lemma 2.3 and successively Lemma 3.5 can be applied. This establishes the existence of a symmetric mixed-strategy equilibrium in which the rent (in expectation) is completely dissipated because both contestants bid (in expectation) V 2 =2. Application of Lemma 3.6 allows to conclude that in any two-bidder contest without common value, say, V 1 V 2 there exists equilibrium strategies for B 1 and B 2 with the properties speci…ed in De…nition 3.1. Assume there are further bidders with valuations lower or equal to V 2 . These contestants B j with j > 2 cannot do better than bidding zero and obtain expected payo¤s of zero. To see this take any pure strategy b 0 . Given 1 , contestant B 2 obtains E 2 ( 1 ; b 0 ) 0 in the two contestants game. By (A), we have that E i ( 1 ; 2 ; b 0 ) = E 2 ( 1 ; b 0 ; 2 ); and by Condition (2:2),
The expected bids imply the expressions for expected equilibrium payo¤s and revenue in the statement of Theorem 3.3.
Applications
In this section we apply Theorem 3.3 to speci…c contests, mainly by checking conditions (SD) and (SM). This shows the practical applicability of these conditions. We start by verifying existing results for the deterministic all-pay auction and the Serial Contest. We turn then to the derivation of new results. Of particular interest is here Tullock's Rent-Seeking Game. Although the hypothesis of Theorem 3.3 does not include homogeneity of the CSF, we focus on this class of CSFs, because of its relevance for applications. 10 
The Deterministic All-Pay Auction
It is instructive to start with the deterministic all-pay auction and derive an equilibrium to this game without using existing results. It is straightforward to see that the deterministic all-pay auction satis…es the hypothesis of Theorem 3.3. Now Theorem 3.3 says that this game has an all-pay auction equilibrium. This is indeed the case; for this is a well established result (Hillman and Riley (1989) and Baye et al. (1996) ). Note that this equilibrium is unique when V 2 > V 3 (see Remark 3.2). Thus, we conclude:
Proposition 4.1. The deterministic all-pay auction has an all-pay auction equilibrium.
The Serial Contest
One way to relax the extreme requirement of the deterministic all-pay auction that the highest bidder wins the contest with probability one, is through the Serial CSF (Alcalde and Dahm (2007) ). Without loss of generality suppose that the vector of bids is ordered such that b 1 b 2 ::: b n . 11 Given a scalar R > 0, the serial CSF assigns
1 0 One interpretation of homogeneity of degree zero is that it does not matter whether lobbying expenditures are measured in dollars or in euros. See also the further discussion in Malueg and Yates (2006) . 1 1 If necessary relabel the set of bidders.
with b n+1 = 0.
Using homogeneity, condition (SD) becomes
x + 2 2(x + 1)
which holds for all R 1. On the other hand, (SM) can be written as
which is true for all R 0. Summarizing, we have the following. 
Tullock' s Rent-Seeking Game
Tullock's CSF is de…ned as in equation (1.1). Again, using homogeneity, conditions (SD) and (SM) simplify. The former becomes
which is ful…lled for x = 0. For x > 0, (following Baye et al. (1994) , p. 379) we obtain
x + 2 (x + 1)
This holds for R 2. The latter condition (SM) can be written as
which is true for all R 0. We have proved the following result. Although the explicit derivation of the equilibrium mixed-strategies is beyond the scope of the present paper, we conclude this subsection computing four examples of the symmetric two-bidder Tullock's Rent-Seeking Game with a …nite strategy space. We represent the cases of R equal to 2, 3, 5 and 1 with a grid of G = 11 in Figure 4 .1. The computations suggest that, as the returns to scale increase, the bulk of probability mass shifts to the right and some mass is attached to low bids. As R increases further, becomes more and more uniformly distributed, which is the optimal bidding strategy in the all-pay auction. 12 
Combining Tullock' s and the Serial Contest
Consider a contest administrator who wants to design a contest that has properties of both Tullock's Rent-Seeking Game and the Serial Contest. In the -TS contest win probabilities are assigned following
with 2 [0; 1] and for all B i 2 B. Using homogeneity, condition (SD) becomes
which we know holds for R 2 because then (4.4) and (4.2) hold. Condition (SM) can be written as
Notice that only the LHS depends on j. Furthermore, this expression can be shown to be increasing in j. Thus, it su¢ ces to verify (SM) for j = x + 1. In this case (SM) becomes 1 4
Given that (4.5) and (4.3) hold it is enough to show that
which is true for all R 0. We obtain, hence, the following. Notice that this result may be interpreted as saying that the all-pay auction equilibrium is very robust. Given that the same equilibrium exists for any combination of the two contests -provided that the contest is deterministic enough (R 2)-the model builder does not really have to decide which model is more realistic.
The Serial Contest with Spillover E¤ects
Note that instead of the power function f i (b) = b R i any homogenous production function for lotteries might be combined with the basic functional form of either Tullock's logit structure or the serial formulation in order to generate another homogeneous CSF.
Consider, for example, the case in which e¤ort represents advertising. Malueg and Yates (2006) introduce a CES production function in order to capture such a setting. Here a contestant's success depends on her private e¤ort b i (her own advertising). But there might be also a public aspect or spillover e¤ect of e¤ort (e.g. increased consumer awareness of the product generated through rivals'advertisements). The following is a variation of the production function introduced in Malueg and Yates
where a c 0, R > T 0 and S > 0. Note that if c = 0, then (4.7) reduces to the classical power function. Notice also that for T = 0, we obtain the exact expression used by Malueg and Yates. In this case a contestant who exerts no e¤ort might still have a positive probability of winning. When T > 0, a positive win probability requires non-zero e¤ort.
With this we can de…ne e.g. the Serial Contest with spillover e¤ects in which win probabilities are assigned following
where f i (b) is de…ned as in (4.7) and f n+1 (b) = 0. Consider the following simple example in which R = 3 and S = T = a = c = 1. We obtain
A ; i = 1; :::; n:
By homogeneity, condition (SD) requires
.
Straightforward manipulation shows that this is true. For (SM), we have that 1 x + 1 G ; j G = (x + 1) 3 + (x + 1)j 2 2(j 3 + (x + 1) 2 j) ; 1 x G ; j G = x 3 + xj 2 2(j 3 + x 2 j) ; and 1 x + 1 G ;
x G = 1 x 3 + x(x + 1) 2 2((x + 1) 3 + x 2 (x + 1)) .
Thus, it must hold that (x + 1) 3 + (x + 1)j 2 2(j 3 + (x + 1) 2 j) 2 1 x 3 + x(x + 1) 2 2((x + 1) 3 + x 2 (x + 1))
which is true if x = 0. For x > 0, it is required that (x + 1) 3 + (x + 1)j 2 (j 3 + x 2 j) (j 3 + (x + 1) 2 j) (x 3 + xj 2 ) 2((x + 1) 3 + x 2 (x + 1)) x 3 + x(x + 1) 2 ((x + 1) 3 + x 2 (x + 1)) .
Expanding terms yields the condition j 5 2x + 2x 2 + 1 +j 3 4x + 8x 2 + 8x 3 + 4x 4 + 1 +j x 2 + 4x 3 + 7x 4 + 6x 5 + 2x 6 0.
We have, hence, shown the following.
Proposition 4.5. In the example in which R = 3 and S = T = a = c = 1, the Serial Contest with spillover e¤ects has an all-pay auction equilibrium.
Discussion
The present paper has o¤ered a robustness analysis of the predictions of the deterministic all-pay auction. In this auction the highest bidder always wins with probability one. We have analyzed non-deterministic contests which respond to di¤erent degrees to the highest bid when assigning the prize. This setting includes -but is not limited to-the popular Tullock's Rent-Seeking Game. Our model is quite general because we did not suppose the existence of a common value and we did not restrict the number of contestants. Not surprisingly, our main result can be interpreted as saying that if the contest is 'not too far away'from the polar case of the all-pay auction, it admits essentially the same equilibrium. This is an important result as it implies that conclusions of models that embed an all-pay auction in a larger model are robust to changes in the contest structure. However, it is somewhat surprising that the contest can be 'quite far away'from the polar case and that there are di¤erent mathematical formulations through which one might depart from the deterministic case. These conclusions follow from the application of our main result to speci…c contests. A by-product of our analysis here is to provide an equilibrium to Tullock's Rent-Seeking Game for increasing returns to scale larger than two, for any number of contestants, and for any valuations for the political prize the contestants might have. But future research concerning this contest in the general setting is still needed in order to determine an equilibrium for R 2 (n=(n 1); 2), to derive the explicit equilibrium strategies and to determine the complete set of equilibria. 13 The question of robustness of the predictions of the deterministic case is important because the polar case has important properties -some of which are known to be not ful…lled when the contest is non-deterministic enough, say, in Tullock's Rent-Seeking Game with R = 1 (see Che and Gale (2000) or Fang (2002) ). This refers to properties concerning incentives for more than two agents to participate in the contest, rent dissipation, exclusion principle (Baye et al. (1993) ), and the preemption e¤ect (Che and Gale (2000)). Our analysis implies that these properties are ful…lled in a wide range of non-deterministic contests.
